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A Virginia statute makes legislators categorically “ineligible to serve on boards,
commissions, and councils within the executive branch of state government who are
responsible for administering programs established by the General Assembly.”1 But
with increasing frequency, the General Assembly has enacted exceptions to this policy.
There is a general exception for bodies “engaged solely in policy studies or com-
memorative activities,”2 and perhaps such bodies need not be in the executive branch
at all. But the Assembly has also enacted exceptions for twenty-one specific boards
and commissions, many of which clearly have executive authority.3 This list of excep-
tions is a miscellany with no obvious pattern, but it includes six educational boards,
one of which is a Board of Visitors.4 The legislation creating the Board of Visitors
of the Virginia School for the Deaf and Blind explicitly acknowledges that it is in the
executive branch,5 and it requires that four legislators serve on the eleven-member
board.6 There are rumors in Richmond that some legislators would like to put legisla-
tors on the Boards of Visitors of other public universities in the Commonwealth.
Such appointments violate the separation of powers and are unconstitutional. I
reach this conclusion on the basis of the clear text of the Virginia Constitution, on
* Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law and Professor of Religious Studies, Uni-
versity of Virginia, and Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law Emeritus, University of
Texas. I am grateful to A.E. Dick Howard for helpful comments on an earlier draft and to
James Hasson for research assistance.
An earlier version of this Article circulated anonymously. I wrote anonymously because
my wife was at that time President of the University of Virginia. I was unwilling to run the risk
that any legislator or government official might blame her or the University for what I wrote,
or that any such official might assume that she or the University put me up to writing it. I
kept the project entirely secret from her; I wanted her to have not just plausible deniability,
but actual, truthful, and absolute deniability. If anyone had asked her about this Article while
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5 VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-346.2(A) (2016).
6 Id. § 22.1-346.2(B).
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the decisions of the Virginia Supreme Court, on the practical consequences, and on
decisions interpreting separation-of-powers provisions in federal law and in other
states. The question is not close. Much of the analysis here would apply to the constitu-
tional law of nearly every state, and to any board or commission in the executive
branch, but my focus will be on the Boards of Visitors of Virginia’s public universities.
I. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSES
There are two separation-of-powers clauses in the Virginia Constitution. Article I,
section 5, titled “Separation of legislative, executive, and judicial departments,” requires
[t]hat the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the
Commonwealth should be separate and distinct;7
And article III, section 1, titled “Division of Powers,” provides,
The legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be sep-
arate and distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly
belonging to the others, nor any person exercise the power of
more than one of them at the same time.8
I will refer to these provisions as the Separation of Powers Clauses. Article I of the
constitution is the Bill of Rights,9 and article I, section 5 is derived, with modest
changes, from the Declaration of Rights adopted on June 12, 1776.10 Article III,
section 1 was part of the original Virginia Constitution adopted by the same body
on June 29, 1776.11 Beginning with the Constitution of 1851, the Declaration of
Rights has been incorporated into the body of the constitution as article I,12 thus
producing two separate but consistent provisions on separation of powers.
The Virginia Supreme Court has enforced these clauses with considerable vigor,
but it has not closely parsed the language.13 In addition to stating the basic principle
twice, the text of the article III clause actually states two related and mutually
7 VA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
8 Id. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
9 Id. art. I.
10 Compare id. § 5, with DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1776, § 5, reprinted in 10 SOURCES
AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 49 (William F. Swindler ed. 1979) [here-
inafter SWINDLER].
11 VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 52. There are no numbered
articles or sections in this constitution. The Separation of Powers Clause is the first substantive
provision, immediately following a preamble.
12 VA. CONST. of 1851, art. I, reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 68–71.
13 See infra Part III.
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reinforcing prohibitions. I will refer to article I, section 5, and to the part of article III,
section 1 that I have put in roman type, as the Departmental Separation Clauses. They
require that the three “departments,” or branches, be kept separate and distinct.14 I will
refer to the italicized part of article III, section 1 as the Personal Separation Clause; it
prohibits any person from exercising the power of two branches at the same time.15
Appointing a legislator to a university’s Board of Visitors would legislatively
interfere with executive-branch functions, with no necessity for doing so, thus vio-
lating the Separation of Powers Clauses as the Supreme Court has interpreted them.16
Even more clearly, such an appointment would result in the same person exercising
both legislative and executive functions at the same time, with no justification what-
ever, thus violating the Personal Separation Clause.
These restrictions are not mere formalities. They are designed to protect the
people by preventing the concentration of power in one or a few individuals, or in
any one branch of government. They respond to the insight that power corrupts, and
that the greater and more concentrated the power, the greater the tendency to cor-
ruption.17 The generation that wrote the Virginia and federal constitutions followed
Montesquieu in believing that “when the legislative and executive powers are united
in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty.”18
James Madison, who served in an apparently minor role on the committee that
drafted Virginia’s Separation of Powers Clauses,19 later wrote in Federalist No. 47
that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed,
or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”20
The initial implementation of this insight, in Virginia and elsewhere, overreacted
to the abuses of George III, putting too much power in legislators and not enough
in the executive.21 But Americans soon recognized that legislative power was also
14 See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
15 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at
134–35 (2d ed. 1998).
18 CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, reprinted in 38 GREAT BOOKS
OF THE WESTERN WORLD 70 (Hutchins ed., 1952)); see also WOOD, supra note 17, at 150–51
(surveying revolutionary fears of concentrated power); Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of
Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 372, 373–74 (1976) (describing the founding genera-
tion’s reliance on Montesquieu).
19 See JEFF BROADWATER, JAMES MADISON: A SON OF VIRGINIA & A FOUNDER OF THE
NATION 8 (2012) (noting that “Madison served in Williamsburg on a committee appointed
to draft a new constitution and a bill of rights for Virginia,” but that “George Mason did most of
the work”). Madison’s principal interest and contribution, not surprisingly, was on the religious-
liberty provision. Id. at 8–9.
20 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 249 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001).
21 See WOOD, supra note 17, at 135–43; Levi, supra note 18, at 374.
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prone to abuse;22 both Madison and Jefferson soon complained that Virginia had
failed to adequately implement its commitment to separation of powers and that the
legislature had too much control over, and too often interfered with, the other
branches.23 A wave of constitutional reform beginning in the 1780s brought the im-
plementation of separation of powers more fully into conformity with the stated
principle, separating and limiting the power of each of the three branches, legisla-
tures included, more explicitly and in greater detail.24 These reforms did not take
hold in Virginia until a good bit later—most obviously, the legislature elected the
governor until the Constitution of 1851—but they did take hold.25
Even at the height of the over-empowered legislatures and under-powered
executives, there seems to have been consensus that separation of powers at least
meant that no person could hold two offices simultaneously.26 Virginia’s Personal
Separation Clause states the part of that prohibition rooted in separation of powers.27
It does not explicitly prohibit a person from simultaneously holding two offices in
the same branch, but it does explicitly prohibit any person from simultaneously
holding offices in two different branches.28
Separation of powers protects the independence of each branch of government
from interference by the others. These principles have many important applications,
but none more important than to the Commonwealth’s public universities. Universi-
ties are places where students and faculty experiment with ideas, pursue ideas both
old and new, and sometimes pursue an idea too far or into a dead end. Faculty re-
search drives new technological developments, new policy solutions, and new eco-
nomic progress. New ideas and serious research depend on academic freedom and
individual initiative. Some of these ideas, and some of this research, will be con-
troversial. The best faculty, and the best students, are always free to go elsewhere,
to private universities or to public universities in states that are more supportive or
less prone to interfere. Direct political interference, especially when motivated by
short-term political goals or issues, can do serious damage.
Public universities require a delicate balancing of the need for public account-
ability and some level of government control with the preservation of institutional
independence and academic control of academic matters. Virginia, and most other
22 See WOOD, supra note 17, at 403–13.
23 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 120–21 (1787); WOOD,
supra note 17, at 451 (quoting a James Madison statement from 1784).
24 See WOOD, supra note 17, at 446–53; Levi, supra note 18, at 374–78.
25 Compare VA. CONST. of 1851, art. V, § 2, reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 82
(“governor shall be elected by the voters”), with VA. CONST. of 1830, art. IV, § 1, reprinted
in SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 64 (“governor, to be elected by the joint vote of the two houses
of the general assembly”), and VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10, at
53 (“[g]overnor, or chief magistrate, shall be chosen annually by joint ballot of both Houses”).
26 See WOOD, supra note 17, at 156.
27 VA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
28 See id.
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states, have attempted to achieve that balance by vesting responsibility in boards that
are largely independent once elected or appointed, and that under normal conditions
will be sympathetic to the university’s mission and respectful of the difference be-
tween broad policy decisions to be made at board level and academic matters best
left to the faculty and to academic administrators. The greater the intrusion of partisan
politics, the greater the threat to institutional independence and to academic excellence.
Few measures would be more calculated to introduce partisan politics than the
appointment of a legislator to a university’s Board of Visitors. Legislators must run
for re-election at frequent intervals. They owe duties to their political party and to
their separate branch of government. Each legislator shares in the awesome power
to make laws for the entire Commonwealth, including for its universities. No legis-
lator may augment that power by also sharing in the executive-branch power to
administer those universities.
II. THE BOARDS OF VISITORS
The Boards of Visitors of Virginia’s public universities are plainly state agencies
in the executive branch, and courts have treated this fact as obvious, both in Virginia29
and elsewhere.30 The General Assembly’s Joint Legislative Audit and Review Com-
mission has also recognized that these boards are part of the executive branch.31 The
Governor appoints persons to the Boards of Visitors,32 and the Governor can remove
Visitors for “malfeasance, misfeasance, incompetence, or gross neglect of duty.”33
This gubernatorial appointment and removal power plainly locates these boards in
the executive branch.
These boards exercise executive authority and perform executive functions.
They supervise and administer large institutions with substantial assets, many em-
ployees, and many students, and in some cases, hospitals and medical practices.34
They are statutorily authorized to manage their institution’s funds, appoint its
29 See George Mason Univ. v. Floyd, 654 S.E.2d 556, 558 (Va. 2008) (explaining why “[i]t
is clear that GMU qualifies as an agency of the Commonwealth”); James v. Jane, 282 S.E.2d
864, 865 (Va. 1980) (describing Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia as “an agency
of the Commonwealth”); see also Collin v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 873
F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (W.D. Va. 1995) (“The Board’s status under Virginia law is the same as
any other state agency.”).
30 See, e.g., Galer v. Bd. of Regents, 236 S.E.2d 617, 618 (Ga. 1977); Att’y Gen. ex rel.
Cook v. Burhans, 7 N.W.2d 370, 371 (Mich. 1942).
31 JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT & REVIEW COMM’N, ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
IN VIRGINIA: A SUMMARY REPORT, H. DOC. NO. 44, at 1–4, 35–36 (1984), http://jlarc.virginia
.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt61.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA84-Y464].
32 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 23.1-2201(A) (2016) (University of Virginia).
33 Id. § 23.1-1300(C) (Supp. 2019).
34 See, e.g., id. § 23.1-2212 (2016) (describing the operations of the Medical Center of
the University of Virginia).
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President and its faculty, fix salaries and tuition, and buy and sell real estate.35 They
are authorized to regulate parking and traffic, the hiring and firing of employees, and
the admission, discipline, and expulsion of students.36 They are instructed to manage
their institution’s endowment37 and are given many powers necessary for the man-
agement of medical centers.38 They have law enforcement responsibilities; they are
authorized to establish a campus police department39 or, at the Board’s election,
require a contiguous local government to provide police protection on campus.40 As
clearly as the governor’s appointment power, these executive powers and functions
mark them as agencies in the executive branch.
III. DECISIONS OF THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT
The Virginia Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that some degree of
“incidental encroachment” between the functions of coordinate branches of govern-
ment is “necessary and permitted.”41 Any system of checks and balances requires
some intersection of the powers of the separate branches. The legislature may delegate
some of its authority to the executive branch if it provides appropriate standards, and
many of the court’s separation-of-powers decisions are about the sufficiency of the
standards accompanying such delegations.42 But the question here is not about one
branch voluntarily delegating some of its powers to another; it is the far more trou-
bling issue of one branch interfering with, or taking over, the functions of another.
The Virginia Supreme Court has often said that the separation of powers is
violated “when one branch exercises the ‘whole power’ of another.”43 This “whole
power” language appears to have originated in Madison’s effort to defend the federal
Constitution against the anti-federalist charge that its various checks and balances vio-
lated the separation of powers.44 He contrasted one branch exercising the whole
power of another with no branch having any partial agency, however limited, in the
work of any other—omitting the obvious and more relevant intermediate possibilities
of partial overlaps or checks of greater or lesser degree.45 Not surprisingly, this “whole
35 Id. § 23.1-1301 (Supp. 2019).
36 Id.
37 Id. § 23.1-2210 (2016).
38 Id. §§ 23.1-2212 to -2213.
39 Id. § 23.1-809.
40 Id. § 23.1-1301(B)(11) (Supp. 2019).
41 Taylor v. Worrell Enters., Inc., 409 S.E.2d 136, 138 (Va. 1991) (plurality opinion).
42 See, e.g., Elizabeth River Crossings OpCo, LLC v. Meeks, 749 S.E.2d 176 (Va. 2013) (up-
holding creation of agency to contract for construction of tunnel and to negotiate tolls, and hold-
ing that tolls were user fees and that legislature had not improperly delegated its power to tax).
43 2016 OP. VA. ATT’Y GEN. 16-013, at 4, https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/Opinions/2016
/McAuliffe_Opinion_28No__16-01329.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7NJ-E7SA] (quoting Winchester
& Strasburg R.R. v. Commonwealth, 55 S.E. 692, 693 (Va. 1906)).
44 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 20, at 250–52.
45 See id.
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power” language is misleading if taken literally. Significant exercises of the powers
of one branch by members of another are prohibited, even though the invasion of the
other branch is far less than total. In practice, the Virginia Supreme Court has struck
down any undue or unjustified interference with one branch by another.46
Thus the legislature cannot require that certain ordinances enacted by a county
board of supervisors be reviewed by a judge to determine, after a judicial hearing,
that the ordinance was necessary.47 This requirement obviously did not transfer the
whole power of the board of supervisors to the judge. The judge could not initiate
legislation; he could review only what had been legislatively enacted, and only with
respect to certain ordinances. But with respect to those ordinances, a significant part
of the legislative function—the power to finally determine what new laws were
necessary—was unconstitutionally transferred to a judge.
Conversely, the legislature cannot exercise or interfere with the judicial power.
Thus the legislature cannot restrict the judicial power to hold in contempt a litigant
who lied to the court about a scheduling matter.48 It did not matter that the contempt
power is only one small part of the judicial power, or that the legislature had not
interfered with most of the cases in which judges hold litigants in contempt. Simi-
larly, the legislature cannot authorize or require the reopening of a final judgment
previously rendered by a court.49 And this was so even though the reopening of
judgments applied to only some cases and to only a single issue within each case,
and even though the original power to decide the cases remained with the courts. It
was enough that an exercise of a significant part of the judicial function—to decide
when and whether to reopen final judgments—had been directed by the legislature.50
The Virginia Supreme Court’s most recent and most extensive decision on
legislative interference with the executive branch is the plurality opinion in Taylor
v. Worrell Enterprises.51 The court explained that “the proper inquiry focuses on the
extent to which [the challenged law] prevents the Executive Branch from accom-
plishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”52 “[W]here the potential for disrup-
tion is present,” the court must “then determine whether that impact is justified by
46 See infra notes 47–56 and accompanying text.
47 Gandy v. Elizabeth City Cty., 19 S.E.2d 97, 99–100 (Va. 1942); see also Bd. of Super-
visors v. Allman, 211 S.E.2d 48, 55–56 (Va. 1975) (holding that the court could invalidate
discriminatory zoning, but could not itself rezone the property, because zoning is a legislative
function).
48 See Carter v. Commonwealth, 32 S.E. 780 (Va. 1899).
49 Ratcliffe v. Anderson, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 105, 106–11 (1878).
50 Id.
51 409 S.E.2d 136 (Va. 1991). This opinion was a plurality because the other justices
thought that the constitutional issue had not been preserved. Id. at 140 (Carrico, C.J., concurring
in result); id. at 140–44 (Hassell, J., dissenting). No justice dissented on the merits of the
separation-of-powers holding.
52 Id. at 139 (plurality opinion) (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
443 (1977)).
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an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority” of the
legislature.53
On the facts in Taylor, the court found that requiring the Governor to make
records of his long-distance phone calls available under the Freedom of Information
Act would violate the separation of powers.54 The compelled disclosure of the data
“could provide a basis for public speculation” that would have a “chilling effect on
the Governor’s use of the telephone for conducting the Commonwealth’s business”
and thus impair his ability to perform his duties.55 It was enough that disclosure
“impairs, though it does not completely destroy, the ability of the executive to per-
form his constitutionally required duties.”56 Taylor did not repeat the “whole power”
language from earlier cases.
No decision of the Virginia Supreme Court directly addresses the appointment
of legislators to executive-branch boards or offices. But it is obvious that a legislator
appointed to a Board of Visitors would quite literally exercise the whole power of
a Visitor. And far from there being any “overriding need” for such appointments,
there is no need whatever. It would not be a statutory regulation of the board or of the
university, passed by both houses and signed by the governor. It would not be any rec-
ognized form of check or balance. It would be a legislator entirely taking over a posi-
tion of authority in the executive branch. Appointing legislators to Boards of Visitors
would be a wholly gratuitous and unjustified violation of the separation of powers.
A legislator serving on an executive-branch board would interfere with the
executive far more directly than in Taylor v. Worrell Enterprises. Such a legislator
would inherently be exercising executive functions. And he would be a constant
presence in the executive deliberations of all other members of the Board. He would
not just arouse curiosity about what they discussed on the telephone—the facts of
Taylor. He could carry the substance of every discussion back to the legislature.
This would include discussions in executive sessions exempt from the Freedom of
Information Act—discussions of personnel, litigation, and other confidential matters.57
He could express legislative disapproval, or threaten legislative retaliation, with re-
spect to any matter at any time. He could influence the Board’s discussions and
debates on every issue before it. The intrusion into the functions of a separate branch
would be deep, persistent, and continuous. As courts elsewhere have said, the only
purpose of putting him there would be to legislatively interfere with the functions
of the executive branch.58
53 Id. (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443) (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 137–39.
55 Id. at 138.
56 Id. at 139.
57 See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3711 (Supp. 2019) (listing subject matters for which
public bodies may meet in closed sessions).
58 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C.
Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 513 U.S. 88 (1994); State ex rel. Woods v. Block, 942 P.2d 428,
436–37 (Ariz. 1997).
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IV. DECISIONS ELSEWHERE
The Virginia courts have not squarely addressed whether legislators can be
appointed to executive-branch boards, but other courts have. These decisions are not
binding in Virginia, but they are persuasive. With the exception of South Carolina,
which has a unique and quite limited conception of separation of powers,59 every court
to consider the issue has held that it is unconstitutional for a legislator to serve on
an executive-branch board.
A. Decisions Squarely on Point
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that it violated that state’s separation-
of-powers clause to appoint legislators to serve on the North Carolina Environmental
Management Commission, which performed executive functions.60 This decision
interpreted language substantially identical to that of the Virginia Constitution: that
the powers of the three branches shall be “separate and distinct.”61 The opinion
helpfully reviews several opinions from other states.62
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that it violated that state’s
separation-of-powers clause to appoint legislators to serve on the State Building
Commission.63 West Virginia appears to have copied its separation-of-powers pro-
vision verbatim from article II of the Virginia Constitution of 1851,64 which was
substantially identical to the current provision in article III, section 1.65
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that it violated that state’s separation-of-
powers clause to appoint legislators to serve on the World Congress Center Authority,
a board created to carry out the provisions of a particular statute.66 The Georgia
provision closely tracks Virginia’s, requiring that the powers of the separate branches
be kept “separate and distinct” and also containing a Personal Separation Clause.67
The Supreme Court of Indiana held that it violated that state’s separation-of-
powers clause68 to appoint legislators to serve on the State Office Building Commis-
sion or any other executive office or board.69
59 See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
60 State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 286 S.E.2d 79, 81–89 (N.C. 1982).
61 Compare N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6, with VA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
62 Wallace, 286 S.E.2d at 84–87.
63 State ex rel. State Bldg. Comm’n v. Bailey, 150 S.E.2d 449, 451–57 (W. Va. 1966).
64 Compare W. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1, with VA. CONST. of 1851, art. II, reprinted in
SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 71.
65 See infra Part VI for the evolution of the Virginia provision.
66 Greer v. State, 212 S.E.2d 836, 837–39 (Ga. 1975).
67 See GA. CONST. of 1945, art. I, § 1, para. 23 (current version at GA. CONST. art. I, § 2,
para. 3).
68 IND. CONST. art. III, § 1.
69 Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm’n, 149 N.E.2d 273, 293–97 (Ind. 1958).
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The Supreme Court of Kansas held that it violates the implicit separation-of-
powers principle in that state’s constitution for legislators to serve on the State Finance
Council, which exercised extensive executive powers.70 The court reached this con-
clusion even though it explicitly rejected “a strict application of the separation of
powers,”71 and even though it said that legislators could serve on boards and com-
missions “where such service falls in the realm of cooperation” and “there is no attempt
to usurp functions of the executive department.”72 But the court found usurpation where
the legislators served on a council that actually exercised executive functions.73
The Supreme Court of Colorado held that it violated that state’s separation-of-
powers clause74 to appoint legislators to a committee to investigate certain claims
involving the state’s legal rights and to authorize the filing of lawsuits to enforce
those rights or to authorize the defense of lawsuits filed against the state.75 These
were executive functions that could not be entrusted to legislators.76
B. Closely Analogous Decisions
The Supreme Court of Virginia has relied on decisions interpreting the federal
separation of powers in interpreting the state provisions.77 There is no express
separation-of-powers clause in the federal Constitution; separation of powers is im-
plied from the separate delegation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers in
Articles I, II, and III.78 From that implicit principle, the Supreme Court of the United
States has concluded that legislators cannot be vested with the power either to ap-
point79 or to remove80 an official performing executive functions. Power to appoint or
remove fell far short of actually entrusting legislators with those functions, but it
interfered with executive-branch control of the official’s executive functions.81
The U.S. Supreme Court has not had to decide whether the general principle of
separation of powers precludes legislators from serving on executive-branch boards,
because the federal Constitution contains an express prohibition: “no Person holding
any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office.”82 But the Court has reached the same conclusion under
70 State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 547 P.2d 786, 790–800 (Kan. 1976).
71 Id. at 791.
72 Id. at 792.
73 Id. at 797–98.
74 COLO. CONST. art. III.
75 Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 223 (Colo. 1912).
76 Id.
77 See Taylor v. Worrell Enters., Inc., 409 S.E.2d 136, 139 (Va. 1991) (plurality opinion)
(citing Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen’l Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
78 See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III.
79 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 119–24, 137–41 (1976).
80 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721–32 (1986).
81 See id. at 726.
82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
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general separation-of-powers principles. It held that appointing legislators to a
committee with an executive function (voting government-owned corporate stock)
violated the implicit separation-of-powers principle of the Philippine Organic Act.83
The District of Columbia Circuit has held that it violates separation of powers
to appoint the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives
as non-voting members of the Federal Election Commission.84 These were not
members of Congress expressly barred from holding another federal office. But they
were legislative officials whose presence would inevitably influence other members
of the Commission, thus violating the broader principle of separation of powers:
[W]e cannot conceive why Congress would wish or expect its
officials to serve as ex officio members if not to exercise some
influence. Even if the ex officio members were to remain com-
pletely silent during all deliberations (a rather unlikely scenario),
their mere presence as agents of Congress conveys a tacit mes-
sage to the other commissioners. The message may well be an
entirely appropriate one—but it nevertheless has the potential to
influence the other commissioners.85
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that legislative leaders could not appoint a
majority of the Constitutional Defense Council, a legislative body with some executive
functions, nor could legislators serve as non-voting advisory members.86 The court
agreed with the D.C. Circuit that even non-voting members “have the ability to influ-
ence the decisions of the board.”87 Arizona’s separation-of-powers clause is similar
to Virginia’s, requiring that the three departments “shall be separate and distinct.”88
The Supreme Court of Alaska held that the legislature could not require legisla-
tive confirmation of executive-branch appointments beyond those for which confir-
mation was required by the state constitution.89 This fell far short of actually putting
legislators on executive-branch boards, but it legislatively interfered with executive
control of those boards.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that it violates that state’s
separation-of-powers clause90 to authorize legislators to approve or disapprove de-
cisions to hire or promote employees in the executive branch.91 The Boards of Visitors
83 Springer v. Gov’t of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
84 Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826–27 (D.C. Cir.
1993), cert. dismissed, 513 U.S. 88 (1994).
85 Id. at 826.
86 State ex rel. Woods v. Block, 942 P.2d 428, 434–37 (Ariz. 1997).
87 Id. at 436–37.
88 Compare ARIZ. CONST. art. III, with VA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
89 Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1, 3–8 (Alaska 1976).
90 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX.
91 In re Op. of the Justices, 341 N.E.2d 254, 255–57 (Mass. 1976).
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of Virginia universities must approve the appointment, promotion, and salary of every
member of the faculty and every senior administrator;92 a legislator serving as a
Visitor would share in that function.
Two state supreme courts have squarely held it unconstitutional for legislators
to serve on boards of public universities.93 These decisions were based on state
constitutional clauses specifically prohibiting legislators from holding other offices,
but Virginia’s Personal Separation Clause also explicitly prohibits any person from
exercising the power of more than one branch at the same time.94 The Supreme
Court of Michigan held that a legislator could not serve on the Board of Regents of
the University of Michigan, even though he had been elected by the people to both
positions.95 This decision was based on a constitutional clause providing that “[n]o
person elected a member of the legislature shall receive any civil appointment within
this state . . . .”96 The court expressly rejected the argument that “regents of the
university are not State officers but only officers of the corporate body known as the
board of regents of the university.”97
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that a legislator could not serve
on the board of Southern State College.98 This decision was based on a clause pro-
viding that “[n]o Senator or Representative shall, during the term for which he shall
have been elected, be appointed or elected to any civil office under this State.”99 The
court also relied on the state’s general separation-of-powers provisions, specifically
including its Personal Separation Clause.100
Two other state supreme courts have held that a legislator may not even be
employed by a state university, again relying on specific provisions addressing that
question. When a tenured professor at Columbus College was elected to the Georgia
legislature, she was forced to resign her position at the college.101 A Georgia statute
provided that “[i]t shall be unlawful for (a) members of the General Assembly to
accept or hold office or employment in the executive branch of the State Government,
92 See, e.g., MANUAL OF THE BOARD OF VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 2004
at 4–5 (rev. 2019) (summarizing Board’s understanding of its own responsibilities); Resolu-
tions Adopted by the Board of Visitors June 6–7, 2019, at 11060–76, https://bov.virginia.edu
/system/files/public/minutes/%2719%20JUN%20FULL%20BOARD%20MINUTES%20
-%20Corrected%206.24.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHE9-VVVG] (listing personnel actions
approved at a single meeting of the Board).
93 Starnes v. Sadler, 372 S.W.2d 585, 586 (Ark. 1963); Att’y Gen. ex rel. Cook v.
Burhans, 7 N.W.2d 370, 371 (Mich. 1942).
94 VA. CONST. art. III, § 1; see infra Part V.
95 Cook, 7 N.W.2d at 370–71.
96 MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. V, § 7 (current version at MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 9).
97 Cook, 7 N.W.2d at 371.
98 Starnes, 372 S.W.2d at 585–86.
99 ARK. CONST. art. V, § 10.
100 Starnes, 372 S.W.2d at 586 (paraphrasing ARK. CONST. art. IV, § 2).
101 Galer v. Bd. of Regents, 236 S.E.2d 617, 618–19 (Ga. 1977).
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or any agency thereof . . . .”102 The professor argued that this statute violated her
fundamental right to participate in the political process and to serve in the legislature
if elected.103 Assuming that such a fundamental right exists, the Supreme Court of
Georgia held that the statute served a compelling government interest by implement-
ing the separation of powers.104 And the court explicitly held that the college was
“an agency of the executive branch of the state government.”105
The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that a cooperative extension agent for
South Dakota State University could not be paid during her term in the legislature.106
This decision was based on a conflict-of-interest clause in the state constitution, which
said that no legislator could be interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with
the state authorized by any law passed during the legislator’s term of office.107 The
legislature passed an appropriation for South Dakota State, and that appropriation
was used to pay salaries, thus funding her employment contract.108 The court did not
rely on the general separation-of-powers clause in the South Dakota constitution.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has decided the other way, holding for
example that legislators could serve on the board of the South Carolina Transporta-
tion Infrastructure Bank.109 But the court recognized that South Carolina “is some-
what singular in the extensive involvement of the legislature in the powers of the
executive and judiciary.”110 And it quoted a treatise describing “South Carolina’s
unique form of government in which the legislative takes a permanent position
among the three theoretically equal branches of government.”111 Decisions from South
Carolina are not precedents for Virginia or other states that take separation of pow-
ers more seriously.
Outside South Carolina, cases across the country agree that legislators cannot
serve in the executive branch, appoint persons to serve in the executive branch, or
otherwise interfere with the selection of personnel in the executive branch. If the
legislature wants to regulate the executive, it must do so through legislation enacted
in the usual way and presented to the governor for signature or veto. It cannot do so
by inserting its members into the executive branch or its processes.
102 Id. at 618 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2309 (rev. 1972) (current version at GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-10-9)).
103 Id. at 618–19.
104 Id. at 619.
105 Id. at 618.
106 Pitts v. Larson, 638 N.W.2d 254 (S.D. 2001).
107 S.D. CONST. art. III, § 12.
108 Pitts, 638 N.W.2d at 255.
109 S.C. Pub. Interest Found. v. S.C. Transp. Infrastructure Bank, 744 S.E.2d 521, 521–28
(S.C. 2013).
110 Id. at 526 (emphasis added).
111 Id. (quoting JAMES L. UNDERWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, VOLUME
1: THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES 13 (1986)
(emphasis added)).
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V. VIRGINIA’S PERSONAL SEPARATION CLAUSE
Virginia decisions on the separation of powers have addressed the broad
principle and have not closely parsed the language of the state Constitution. But that
language explicitly prohibits appointing a member of one branch to exercise the
powers of another. Article III, section 1 provides:
The legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be sepa-
rate and distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly
belonging to the others, nor any person exercise the power of
more than one of them at the same time.112
The italicized Personal Separation Clause is a separate and distinct prohibition.
No department may exercise the powers of either of the other two (the Departmental
Separation Clause, in roman type), and no person may exercise the powers of two
departments at the same time (the Personal Separation Clause, in italics). Appointing
a legislator to an executive-branch agency or board appears to violate each of these
clauses, but it unambiguously violates the second. The legislator appointed would
be serving in the legislature, exercising the whole power of a legislator, and also in
the executive branch, exercising the whole power of a Visitor, at the same time.
This Personal Separation Clause is Virginia’s equivalent of the federal, Michigan,
and Arkansas clauses that expressly prohibit legislators from holding any other
office.113 It applies not just to legislators, but to any person serving in any branch of
government; no person in any branch can simultaneously serve in either of the other
two branches.
Grammatically, the Personal Separation Clause is a dependent clause, attached
to the independent clause that requires the three departments to be “separate and
distinct.”114 For at least two independent reasons, this does not affect the meaning
of the clause. First, the Personal Separation Clause was grammatically independent,
unambiguously a separate prohibition, through Virginia’s first five Constitutions.115
The change from independent to dependent clause happened in the Committee on
Final Revision and Adjustment, an editorial committee with no power to make
substantive changes, in the convention that produced the Constitution of 1902.116
This change was stylistic, not substantive; the clause still means what it meant as an
independent clause in earlier Constitutions. The details of this drafting history are
set out in Part VI.
112 VA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
113 See supra notes 82, 96, 99 and accompanying text.
114 VA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
115 See infra Part VI.
116 See infra text accompanying notes 134–37.
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Second, even if this Personal Separation Clause is treated as simply stating a
purpose of the Departmental Separation Clause, it is a purpose that is fully achiev-
able, and it is a purpose that need never be violated. At the very least, this language
says that the Departmental Separation Clause is to be interpreted and enforced to the
end that no person shall exercise the powers of two branches at the same time.117
There are plausible reasons, including checks and balances and the inevitable
overlap of functions, for one branch to sometimes modestly intrude into the func-
tions of another. There are reasons for creating modern administrative agencies that
exercise mixed powers with respect to particular subject matters. The Virginia Con-
stitution therefore authorizes the creation of administrative agencies “with such
authority and duties as the General Assembly may prescribe”118—but it carefully
does not say with such “personnel” as the legislature may prescribe. Such adminis-
trative agencies may have mixed functions, but in most cases, some or many of
those functions are clearly executive.
Neither of these reasons, nor any other reason, can justify electing or appointing
the same individual to serve in two branches of government at the same time. There
are more than six million adult Virginians available to serve,119 and many of them
would be qualified. To appoint legislators to executive-branch boards would be
violating separation of powers for the sake of the violation—for the very purpose
of imposing legislative influence or control on an executive-branch function.
The violation would seem obvious and flagrant if a legislator were appointed or
elected to serve on the Supreme Court, or as Governor, or as Secretary of an
executive-branch department. The violation should be equally obvious, and it is
equally flagrant, when a legislator is appointed to a Board of Visitors. Each Visitor
exercises part of the executive-branch function, and any hope that other members
of the Board might proceed uninfluenced by the legislative intrusion is delusional.
Of course they would be influenced; as the D.C. Circuit said, that would be the very
purpose of appointing a legislator in the first place.120
VI. THE EVOLUTION OF VIRGINIA’S SEPARATION-OF-POWERS CLAUSES
Virginia’s Separation of Powers Clauses have evolved stylistically over the
years, but there has been little substantive change. For much of Virginia’s history
as a state, the Personal Separation Clause was grammatically an independent clause.
The Constitution of 1776 provided:
117 See VA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
118 Id.
119 See Quick Facts Virginia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact
/table/VA,US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/HNR8-P8RN] (noting that the total estimated popu-
lation in Virginia is 8,517,685 and that approximately 22% of that population is under 18).
120 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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The legislative, executive, and judiciary department, shall be
separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers prop-
erly belonging to the other: nor shall any person exercise the
powers of more than one of them, at the same time; except that
the Justices of the County Courts shall be eligible to either
House of Assembly.121
This 1776 text clearly contains an independent clause that prohibits any person from
exercising the powers of two branches at the same time.122 The express exception for
county judges further confirms this meaning; without the express exception, these
judges could not have served in two branches at the same time.123
This provision was carried forward with minor stylistic tweaks in the Constitu-
tion of 1830. “[D]epartment” in the first line was changed to “departments”; “the other”
was changed to “either of the others,” and the colon after this phrase was changed
to a semicolon; the commas after “department” and after “one of them” were omit-
ted; the semicolon after “same time” was changed to a comma; and the capitalization
was dropped in the exception for county judges.124 None of these changes affected
meaning, and the Personal Separation Clause was still an independent clause. The
provision now read:
The legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be
separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers prop-
erly belonging to either of the others; nor shall any person
exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time,
except that the justices of the county courts shall be eligible to
either house of assembly.125
In the Constitution of 1851, the reference to “justices of the county courts” was
changed to “justices of the peace”; there was no change in the clauses of interest
here.126 That version was carried forward verbatim in the Constitution of 1864.127 In
the Constitution of 1870, the exception for justices of the peace was reduced to a
cross reference; there was no other change:
121 VA. CONST. of 1776 (emphasis added), reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 52.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 Compare VA. CONST. of 1830, art. II, reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 59,
with VA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 52.
125 VA. CONST. of 1830, art. II (emphasis added), reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10,
at 59.
126 Compare VA. CONST. of 1851, art. II, reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 71,
with VA. CONST. of 1830, art. II, reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 59.
127 VA. CONST. of 1864, art. II, reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 94.
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The legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be
separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers prop-
erly belonging to either of the others; nor shall any person
exercise the power of more than one of them at the same time,
except as hereinafter provided.128
No exception was later provided; no provision in the Constitution of 1870 authorizes
any person to serve in two branches at the same time.129
Through each of these five Constitutions, the prohibition on any person serving
in two branches at the same time was unambiguously a freestanding and independent
prohibition. In the 1901 Convention, which proposed and enacted the Constitution
of 1902,130 the relevant substantive committee proposed to continue verbatim the
separation-of-powers language of the 1870 Constitution, and its report mentioned
no changes to the relevant clauses.131 That committee’s proposals were considered
by the Committee of the Whole,132 and then by the Convention,133 each of which also
retained the 1870 language verbatim.134 The Personal Separation Clause was still an
independent clause.
That draft was then referred to the Committee on Final Revision and Adjustment.
This committee was an editorial committee, not a substantive committee. It reported
that it had “observed the rule of making no changes in the articles as they were
adopted by the Convention, except such as are necessary or proper to give greater
128 VA. CONST. of 1870, art. II (emphasis added), reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10,
at 116.
129 See VA. CONST. of 1870, reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 112–41.
130 Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., The Evolution of Virginia’s Constitutions: A Celebration
of the Rule of Law in America, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007).
131 See JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1901). The provision was assigned
to the Committee on Preamble and Bill of Rights, the Division of Governmental Powers and
on Such Portions of the Constitution as Shall Not Be Referred to Other Committees. Committee
reports are reprinted in the back of the Journal of the Constitutional Convention; they are not
continuously paginated and so cannot be cited by page number. The Committee on Preamble etc.
filed four reports, one of which is a minority report, and one of which is simply the Committee’s
proposed constitutional text. None of the four reports discusses the separation of powers.
132 See Report of the Committee on Preamble and Bill of Rights, the Division of Govern-
mental Powers and on Such Portions of the Constitution as Shall Not Be Referred to Other
Committees, as Amended by the Committee of the Whole, in JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION (1901); see also II REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION 2097–139, 2578–624 (1906) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES]
(containing the discussion in the Committee of the Whole).
133 See PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, supra note 132, at 2745–59 (containing the Conven-
tion’s discussion of the Committee’s report as amended by the Committee of the Whole).
134 DRAFT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA AS FINALLY ADOPTED BY THE CONVENTION
AND REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE ON FINAL REVISION AND ADJUSTMENT OF THE VARIOUS
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT MAY BE AGREED UPON, AND UPON THE SCHEDULE
5 (1902).
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clearness and conciseness to the expression of what is believed to be the true intent and
meaning of the Convention.”135 And it said that “no substantial change in, or addition
to, the instrument has been made, except when such amendments were clearly neces-
sary to the efficient operation of the articles as they came to us from the Convention.”136
The change from independent to dependent clause happened in the Committee
on Final Revision and Adjustment. The cross reference was moved from the end to
the beginning, the verb necessary to an independent clause was omitted, and the two
clauses were combined by changing the semicolon to a comma:
Except as hereinafter provided, the legislative, executive and
judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither
exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others,
nor any person exercise the powers of more than one of them at
the same time.137
The entire Convention then reviewed the Committee’s draft section by section,138
and the Separation of Powers Clause as modified by the Committee on Final Revi-
sion and Adjustment became the clause in the Constitution of 1902.139 Once again,
no later section created any exception to the Personal Separation Clause.
Clearly this change in the Committee on Final Revision and Adjustment was
understood as stylistic, not substantive. The change could not possibly have been under-
stood as a substantive change “clearly necessary to the efficient operation of the
articles.”140 The Committee offered no explanation for the change; it did not suggest
any change in meaning, however slight or nuanced. In the discussion of the Commit-
tee’s draft in the Convention, no one suggested that the Committee had changed the
meaning of the Separation of Powers Clause. The change was stylistic, and understood
as such, and the Constitution is best understood as still containing an independent
prohibition on the same person serving in two branches at the same time.
The Commission on Constitutional Revision, whose report led to the Constitution
of 1971, reviewed the history of the separation-of-powers provisions in Virginia’s Con-
stitutions.141 Describing the changes from 1776 to 1969, the Commission said, “Since
1776 the language of the section has changed in two regards: the elimination of the
special exception regarding county courts, and the addition of the qualifying clause,
135 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, supra note 132, at 3097.
136 Id.
137 THE DRAFT OF THE CONSTITUTION AND SCHEDULE AS REPORTED TO THE CONVENTION
BY THE COMMITTEE ON FINAL REVISION AND ADJUSTMENT 17 (1902) (emphasis added).
138 See PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, supra note 132, at 3260–63.
139 VA. CONST. of 1902, art. III, § 39, reprinted in SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 153. In the
Constitution of 1902, sections were numbered continuously from article to article.
140 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, supra note 132, at 3097 (emphasis added).
141 THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION 121 (1969) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION].
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found in present section 39, ‘Except as hereinafter provided.’”142 The Commission
did not treat the change from an independent to a dependent clause as a change.
In the Constitution of 1971, the cross reference to possible but non-existent ex-
ceptions was dropped. The word “neither” was changed to “none,” and “either of the
others” was simplified to just “the others.”143 And a provision was added “acknowl-
edging the existence of regulatory agencies which are not solely legislative, or
executive, or judicial.”144 The language relevant here was unchanged. And so we
have the current provision, which reads in full:
The legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be sep-
arate and distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly
belonging to the others, nor any person exercise the power of
more than one of them at the same time; provided, however,
administrative agencies may be created by the General Assembly
with such authority and duties as the General Assembly may
prescribe. Provisions may be made for judicial review of any
finding, order, or judgment of such administrative agencies.145
The italicized Personal Separation Clause should be treated as an independent and
free standing prohibition, as it always had been before the stylistic tweak in 1902.
But even treating it as a dependent clause, it states a fundamental purpose of the entire
provision. Powers shall be separate and distinct “so that” no person exercises the power
of more than one branch at the same time.146 This clause squarely prohibits any
legislator from serving on an executive-branch board, including a Board of Visitors.
VII. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY’S VIEW, AND SOME COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
As noted at the beginning, the General Assembly has generally recognized the
impropriety of its members serving on executive-branch boards “responsible for
administering programs established by the General Assembly.”147 The statute ex-
pressly forbids such appointments and declares any other statutes that may provide
for such appointments to be void.148 But this latter provision merely forces any
exceptions to be codified in the same statutory section that creates the prohibition,
and the Assembly has enacted a number of express exceptions to this principle.149
142 Id.
143 Compare VA. CONST. art. III, § 1, with VA. CONST. of 1902, art. III, § 39, reprinted in
SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 153.
144 COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, supra note 141, at 122.
145 VA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
146 Id.
147 VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2101 (Supp. 2019).
148 Id.
149 Id.
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The mere fact that these exceptions have existed, and that no one has challenged
them, does not mean that they are constitutional. It means only that no one has
seriously considered the question and that the courts have had no occasion to rule.
The North Carolina court considered a similar situation when it held that legislators
could not serve on an executive-branch board.150 The litigants defending such ap-
pointments in North Carolina listed forty-nine other boards and commissions with
legislative members.151 The court ruled only with respect to the one board in the case
before it.152 But it squarely rejected the relevance of the other forty-nine; the fact that
it had become somewhat common to appoint legislators to boards and commissions
did not make it consistent with separation of powers or foreclose adjudication of the
issue when it was finally presented to the courts.153 Similarly in the South Dakota case,
it did not matter that “other state employees have served in the legislature in the past.”154
In 2016, the General Assembly attempted to create another exception, providing
that legislators and persons appointed by legislators would constitute a majority of the
Virginia Growth and Opportunity Board.155 The Attorney General advised the Governor
that this structure would probably be unconstitutional,156 and the Assembly enacted a
new bill providing for legislators to be a minority of the Board.157 There is no negative
implication in this Attorney General opinion that legislators on the Board would be
permissible if legislators were a minority of the Board, or if only one legislator
served on the Board. The Attorney General answered the only question he was asked,
about a particular proposed statute that provided for majority control by the legisla-
ture.158 He expressed no opinion on any lesser number of legislators filling executive-
branch positions.
If legislators could be appointed to multi-member bodies in the other two branches
so long as they did not constitute a majority, little would be left of separation of powers.
Recall that the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court of Arizona held that even non-
voting members violated separation of powers, because their only plausible purpose
was to intrude legislative influence into an executive-branch body.159 Suppose that a
legislator, or three legislators, were appointed to the Virginia Supreme Court. No one
would say that it doesn’t matter because they would be only one or three votes on a




154 Pitts v. Larson, 638 N.W.2d 254, 259 (S.D. 2001) (Gors, J., concurring).
155 H.B. 834, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016).
156 2016 OP. VA. ATT’Y GEN. 16-013, supra note 43.
157 See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2485 (2017).
158 See 2016 OP. VA. ATT’Y GEN. 16-013, supra note 43.
159 Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
cert. dismissed, 513 U.S. 88 (1994); State ex rel. Woods v. Block, 942 P.2d 428, 436–37
(Ariz. 1997).
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seven-judge court. It is no different if a legislator is appointed to be one member of
a Board of Visitors.
Finally, there is an overlapping provision in article IV, section 4, which states
the qualifications of legislators and explicitly prohibits holders of certain offices
from serving in the legislature:
No person holding a salaried office under the government of the
Commonwealth, and no judge of any court, attorney for the
Commonwealth, sheriff, treasurer, assessor of taxes, commis-
sioner of the revenue, collector of taxes, or clerk of any court
shall be a member of either house of the General Assembly
during his continuance in office; and his qualification as a mem-
ber shall vacate any such office held by him.160
Most of the offices specifically mentioned are local offices, and the Separation
of Powers Clauses arguably refer only to the powers of the Commonwealth; the
prohibition on holding certain combinations of state and local offices adds some-
thing that is not unambiguously there in the Separation of Powers Clauses. But the
first phrase of article IV, section 4, providing that “[n]o person holding a salaried
office under the government of the Commonwealth” may serve in the legislature
appears to be redundant with the two Separation of Powers Clauses.161 Considered
in isolation, it might give rise to a negative inference that persons holding unpaid
offices may serve in the legislature, and carrying it one step further, that legislators
might be appointed to unpaid offices in the executive branch.
But this reading would strip any meaning out of the Personal Separation Clause
in article III as that clause applies to the legislature. It would permit legislators to
serve in any unpaid office in either of the other branches of government. It is clear
that the constitution’s drafters were not avoiding redundancy in this area, or adher-
ing to any drafting convention that each word or clause must add some meaning
independent of all the others. Each clause must mean something, but the meanings
may overlap. We know this because they repeated the Departmental Separation Clause,
almost verbatim, in article I, section 5162 and article III, section 1.163 Article IV, section
4 is about the qualifications of legislators and the intrusion of other office holders
into the legislature.164 The application of article III, section 1 under discussion here
is about the converse: the intrusion of legislators into the other branches. Article IV,
section 4 does not address that question.165
160 VA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
161 Id.
162 Id. art. I, § 5.
163 Id. art. III, § 1.
164 Id. art. IV, § 4.
165 See id.
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There is an opinion of the Attorney General allowing a legislator to serve for
ninety days as a temporary assistant Commonwealth’s attorney, on the ground that
that position is not mentioned in article IV, section 4.166 The Attorney General treated
this as a local office and not as “a salaried office under the government of the Com-
monwealth.”167 Perhaps because he viewed the office as local, or perhaps because
he was asked only about article IV, section 4, the opinion does not mention either
Separation of Powers Clause and is not an interpretation of those clauses.168 The
opinion relies in part on a Supreme Court decision interpreting a similar provision
in article VII, section 6, which prohibits dual office holding in local government.169
The court in that case did not mention the Separation of Powers Clause either, and
it explicitly refused to consider another constitutional clause that one side relied
on.170 It read the implementing statute at issue as based exclusively on article VII,
section 6 and as confining the dispute to that section.171
Perhaps the most relevant thing the court said is that it would follow the plain
meaning of article VII, section 6: “When the language of an enactment is plain and
unambiguous, as in this case, we apply its plain meaning.”172 Other Virginia cases
also emphasize adherence to the plain meaning of the constitutional text.173 And
article III, section 1 plainly prohibits any one person from exercising the powers of
more than one branch of government at the same time.174 The three great branches
of government shall be separate and distinct so that none exercise the powers of the
others and so that no person exercises the power of more than one of them at the
same time. This language should be enforced according to its terms.
CONCLUSION
Appointing a legislator to a Board of Visitors would violate the separation of pow-
ers. It would violate the Departmental Separation Clauses by intruding into and
influencing executive-branch functions. And it would flagrantly violate the Personal
Separation Clause by permitting the same person to exercise the whole power of a legis-
lative position and the whole power of an executive-branch position at the same time.
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